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As the technological and operational capabilities of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) have grown, so too
have international efforts to integrate UAS into civil airspace. However, one of the major concerns that
must be addressed in realizing this integration is that of safety. For example, UAS lack an on-board pilot to
comply with the legal requirement that pilots see and avoid other aircraft. This requirement has motivated
the development of a detect and avoid (DAA) capability for UAS that provides situational awareness and
maneuver guidance to UAS operators to aid them in avoiding and remaining well clear of other aircraft in
the airspace. The NASA Langley Research Center Formal Methods group has played a fundamental role in
the development of this capability. This article gives a selected survey of the formal methods work conducted
in support of the development of a DAA concept for UAS. This work includes specification of low-level and
high-level functional requirements, formal verification of algorithms, and rigorous validation of software
implementations.
1. INTRODUCTION
In their 2013 economic report, the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems Inter-
national (AUVSI) [Jenkins and Vasigh 2013] projected the cumulative impact of the
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) industry on the US economy between 2015 and
2025 to be more than US $80 billion and the generation of more than one hundred
thousand jobs. As the availability of and applications for UAS grow in the US and
worldwide, there have been concerted efforts by stakeholders throughout the inter-
national community aimed at addressing the problem of safely integrating UAS into
standard airspace operations. NASA’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the
National Airspace System (UAS in the NAS) project aims to developing key capabili-
ties to enable routine and safe access for public and civil use of UAS in non-segregated
airspace operations.
One of the major challenges to the safe integration of UAS into the NAS is the lack of
an on-board pilot to comply with particular US and international legal requirements.
In manned aircraft operations on-board pilots have, in part, the responsibility for not
“operating an aircraft so close to another aircraft as to create a collision hazard” [Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 2005a; US Code of Federal Regulations
1967a], “to see and avoid other aircraft” [International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) 2005b; US Code of Federal Regulations 1967b], and when complying with the
particular rules addressing right-of-way, on-board pilots “may not pass over, under,
or ahead [of the right-of-way aircraft] unless well clear” [International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) 2005b; US Code of Federal Regulations 1967b]. To address the
safety challenge and establish parallel requirements for UAS, the final report of the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Sense and Avoid (SAA) Workshop [FAA Spon-
sored Sense and Avoid Workshop 2009] defined the concept of sense and avoid as “the
capability of a UAS to remain well clear from and avoid collisions with other airborne
traffic.” This definition has been proposed as a means of compliance with the preceding
legal requirements.
In the case of manned aircraft operations, the ability to remain well clear and see
and avoid other aircraft depends upon the perception and judgement of the human
pilot. In absence of an on-board pilot, there is a need for a formal understanding of the
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notion of well-clear, which resolves this ambiguity and is appropriate for integrated
UAS operations [Cru¨ck and Lygeros 2007; Coulter 2009; Tomasello and Haddon 2011;
Weibel et al. 2011; Adaska 2012; Theunissen et al. 2014; Consiglio et al. 2012]. In
recent years, efforts to provide such a definition have been underway.
In 2011, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics established the UAS Sense and Avoid Science and Research Panel (SARP)
and charged it with making a recommendation for a quantitative definition of well
clear. In 2013, the RTCA organization established Special Committee 228 (SC-228) to
provide technical guidance to the FAA for defining minimum operational performance
standards for a UAS sense and avoid concept, which is now called detect and avoid,
based on the quantitative definition of well-clear recommended by the UAS SARP. The
NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) Formal Methods group closely collaborated
with the UAS SARP to both identify a mathematical definition of well clear that was
appropriate for UAS operations and verify that it satisfied operational requirements.
The LaRC Formal Methods group is currently participating in the RTCA SC-228, and
has responsibility for the specification, development, and verification of a reference
implementation of the algorithms that support the overall UAS DAA concept. This
article presents an overview of the research undertaken by the LaRC Formal Methods
group while collaborating with these groups, and addresses some of the key technical
challenges in Formal Methods research in the context of the development and safety
analysis of advanced air traffic management concepts.
The mathematical formulas and theorems presented in the subsequent sections have
been formally specified and verified in the Prototype Verification System (PVS) [Owre
et al. 1992].1 However, to make the article accessible to a broader audience, the formu-
las and theorems herein are expressed in mathematical notation instead of concrete
PVS syntax. Furthermore, the states of the aircraft pair of interest, denoted ownship
and intruder, are represented by position and velocity vectors in a local East, North, Up
(ENU) Cartesian coordinate system. This coordinate system is based on the orthogo-
nal projection of the ownship and intruder geodesic coordinates onto a plane tangent to
the projected ownship position on the surface of the earth. For notational convenience,
horizontal and vertical components of a three-dimensional vector are represented by
a two-dimensional vector and a scalar, respectively, and these components are given
in a relative coordinate system, where the intruder is at the origin, and the ownship
moves relative to the intruder. Letters in bold-face, e.g., v, s, denote two-dimensional
vectors. Finally, vector operations such as addition, subtraction, scalar multiplication,
dot product, i.e., s · v ≡ sxvx + syvy, the square of a vector, i.e., s2 ≡ s · s, and the norm
of a vector, i.e., ‖s‖ ≡
√
s2, are defined in a two-dimensional Euclidean geometry.
2. WELL-CLEAR VOLUME
Consiglio et al. proposed a UAS detect and avoid concept where the well-clear notion
is defined by a protected volume around the UAS [Consiglio et al. 2012]. If no traffic
aircraft is located inside this volume, the UAS is considered to be well clear. A key idea
in this proposal is that the protected volume is assumed to be large enough to avoid
resolution advisories from a collision avoidance system, but small enough to avoid
disruption to traffic flow. Subsequently, several candidate definitions of the well-clear
volume were proposed to the UAS SARP, and they were analyzed with respect to these
conceptual requirements as well as other operational requirements [Cook et al. 2015].
The definition of the well-clear volume ultimately recommended by the UAS SARP,
and adopted by RTCA SC-228, is a boolean formula based on the second generation
1For further information on this formal development, the reader is referred to the directories TCASII,
WellClear, and DAIDALUS available in the NASA PVS Library (https://github.com/nasa/pvslib).
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of the Traffic Alerting and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS II) Resolution Advisory
(RA) detection logic. In particular, the well-clear volume is defined by a predicate on
the relative position and velocity vectors of the ownship and intruder at the current
time. This predicate determines that two aircraft are well clear of each other when
computed distance and time functions fall outside a set of predefined threshold values.
The particular distance and time functions used in the definition of the well-clear vol-
ume are based on those used in the TCAS II RA detection logic [Mun˜oz et al. 2013] and
are discussed in the subsequent presentation.
A well-clear violation is defined as a situation when there is both a horizontal and a
vertical violation. That is, the predicate defining the well-clear volume is a conjunction
of two predicates, one representing the horizontal dimension and the other represent-
ing the vertical dimension, as given in Formula (1).
WCV(s, sz,v, vz) ≡ HWCV(s,v) ∧ VWCV(sz, vz), (1)
Here s,v ∈ R2 are the respective relative horizontal position and velocity vectors of
the aircraft pair, and sz, vz ∈ R are the respective relative vertical position and veloc-
ity of the aircraft pair. The horizontal and vertical violation predicates are defined in
Formula (2) and Formula (3), respectively.
HWCV(s,v) ≡ ‖s‖ ≤ DMOD ∨ (HMDF(s,v) ∧ 0 ≤ τmod(s,v) ≤ TAUMOD), (2)
VWCV(sz, vz) ≡ |sz| ≤ ZTHR ∨ 0 ≤ tcoa(sz, vz) ≤ TCOA, (3)
where TAUMOD and DMOD are horizontal time and distance thresholds, respectively, and
TCOA and ZTHR are vertical time and distance thresholds, respectively. The predicate
HMDF refers to the horizontal miss-distance filter and is defined as in Formula (4).
HMDF(s,v) ≡ dcpa(s,v) ≤ HMD, (4)
where HMD is the horizontal miss-distance threshold and is typically set to the same
value as DMOD. The distance function dcpa computes the projected horizontal distance
between the aircraft at their closest point of approach in the horizontal dimension, as-
suming constant relative horizontal velocity v, and is formally defined in Formula (5).
dcpa(s,v) ≡ ‖s+ tcpa(s,v)v‖. (5)
The time function tcpa in Formula (5) is the time to closest point of approach, and is
defined as
tcpa(s,v) ≡
{− s·vv2 if ‖v‖ 6= 0,
0 otherwise,
(6)
where the inequality s · v < 0 holds when the aircraft are horizontally converging,
s ·v > 0 holds when the aircraft are horizontally diverging, and s ·v equals 0 when the
aircraft are at their horizontal closest point of approach.
The time function τmod (modified tau) was introduced in the TCAS II RA logic [Ham-
mer 1996]. In the vector notation used in this article, modified tau is defined in For-
mula (7).
τmod(s,v) ≡
{
DMOD2−s2
s·v if s · v < 0,
−1 otherwise. (7)
The time function tcoa computes the time to co-altitude, assuming constant relative
vertical speed vz, and is defined in Formula (8).
tcoa(sz, vz) ≡
{
− szvz if szvz < 0,
−1 otherwise. (8)
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Fig. 1. Top View of Well-Clear Volume
In a way similar to the horizontal case, the product szvz characterizes whether the
aircraft are vertically diverging, i.e., szvz > 0, or vertically converging, i.e., szvz <
0. For completeness, time to co-altitude is defined as −1 when the aircraft are not
vertically converging.
The values of the distance and time thresholds recommended by the UAS
SARP [Cook et al. 2015] and adopted by the RTCA SC-228 are DMOD = HMD = 4000 ft,
ZTHR = 450 ft, TAUMOD = 35 s, and TCOA = 0 s. The shaded area in Figure 1 illustrates
the resultant top view of the ownship’s well-clear volume with respect to an intruder
aircraft for an example encounter. Any traffic aircraft located inside this area with the
same velocity vector as the intruder aircraft will be in well-clear violation with the
UAS. The diameter of the circular base of the well-clear volume is DMOD. The length of
the elongated shape depends on TAUMOD. The shape is elongated in the direction of the
relative velocity vector.
For arbitrary values of DMOD, ZTHR, TAUMOD, and TCOA, with HMD = DMOD, Formula (1)
satisfies several operational requirements [Mun˜oz et al. 2014]. For instance, in a pair-
wise encounter, the ownship and intruder aircraft make the same determination of
their well-clear status. That, both aircraft are simultaneously aware of an in agree-
ment on a well-clear violation. This property is called symmetry, and it is formally
stated in Theorem 2.1.
THEOREM 2.1 (SYMMETRY). For all relative states s, sz,v, vz, WCV(s, sz,v, vz) =
WCV(−s,−sz,−v,−vz).
Another important property states that for straight line trajectories there is at most
one time interval where the aircraft are not well clear. This property is called lo-
cal convexity, and it enables the definition of an alerting algorithm that, in a non-
maneuvering encounter, continuously alerts a predicted well-clear violation until the
violation disappears. Once the violation disappears, it does not reappear unless the
aircraft maneuver. This property is formally stated in Theorem 2.2.
THEOREM 2.2 (LOCAL CONVEXITY). For all relative states s, sz,v, vz, if there are
times 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 such that WCV(s+t1v, sz+t1vz,v, vz) and WCV(s+t2v, sz+t2vz,v, vz),
then for all times t1 ≤ t ≤ t2, WCV(s+ tv, sz + tvz,v, vz).
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The well-clear volume defined by Formula (1) assumes perfect aircraft state informa-
tion. To accomodate for uncertainty in the position and velocity information, the RTCA
SC-228 requirements for the well-clear alerting logic allows for the use of a larger set
of threshold values within some specified ranges, giving an extended well-clear volume.
This extended well-clear volume is characterized by a predicate WCV∗ defined by For-
mula (1), using parameters DMOD∗ ≥ DMOD, HMD∗ ≥ HMD, ZTHR∗ ≥ ZTHR, TAUMOD∗ ≥ TAUMOD,
and TCOA∗ ≥ TCOA. Theorem 2.3 formally states that the well-clear volume instanti-
ated with the RTCA SC-228 standard threshold values is safely included in any of its
extensions.
THEOREM 2.3 (EXTENSION). For all relative states s, sz,v, vz, WCV(s, sz,v, vz) =⇒
WCV∗(s, sz,v, vz).
The extension property enables the definition of formally verified alerting and maneu-
vering algorithms that completely protect against the violation of the standard well-
clear volume by using a more conservative definition.
3. WELL-CLEAR AND TCAS II INTEROPERABILITY
TCAS is a family of airborne devices that are designed to reduce the risk of mid-air
collisions between aircraft equipped with operating transponders. TCAS II [RTCA SC-
147 2009], the current generation of TCAS devices, is mandated in the US for aircraft
with greater than 30 seats or a maximum takeoff weight greater than 33,000 pounds.
Although not required, TCAS II is also installed on many turbine-powered general
aviation aircraft. TCAS II provides resolution advisories (RAs), which are visual and
vocalized alerts that direct pilots to maintain or increase vertical separation with in-
truders that are considered collision threats.
Formula (1), which defines the UAS well-clear volume, closely follows the formula
that defines the logic of the TCAS II RA detection algorithm. The primary difference
between the well-clear volume, as defined by RTCA SC-228, and the TCAS II RA vol-
ume is in the particular choice of time and distance threshold values. The TCAS II RA
detection logic uses a lookup table indexed by the altitude of the ownship to determine
which set of threshold values to use. For some entries, e.g., for aircraft flying above
10,000 ft, the TCAS II RA threshold values are higher than the well-clear threshold
values. Due to these particular instances of larger threshold values for TCAS II, the
well-clear volume is not a proper extension of the TCAS II RA volume. Hence, The-
orem 2.3 does not apply to these cases. Thus, in practice, it is possible that TCAS II
issues an RA before the ownship declares a well-clear violation. The vertical thresh-
old values in the well-clear definition are also problematic. Indeed, ZTHR and TCOA for
the well-clear volume are set to 450 ft and 0 s, respectively, and these values are al-
ways smaller than the corresponding threshold values in the TCAS II RA table. This
choice of values affects the interoperability of the UAS DAA concept with TCAS II in
encounters with high vertical closure rate [Upchurch et al. 2015].
There are operational justifications for this mismatch between the well-clear defi-
nition and the TCAS II RA threshold values. For instance, the detect and avoid con-
cept considered by RTCA SC-228 only applies to certain types of UAS and in classes
of airspace that are usually below 10,000 ft, that is, Class D, Class E, and perhaps
Class G airspace. Additionally, the negative effects of this mismatch, i.e., TCAS II RAs
preceding well-clear violations, may be mitigated by the use of extended well-clear
volumes in the alerting and maneuvering algorithms, which are also part of the RTCA
SC-228 UAS detect and avoid concept. Theorem 3.1 states that there are extended well
clear volumes that properly include the TCAS II RA volume.
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THEOREM 3.1 (INCLUSION). Let HMD∗ = DMOD∗, TAUMOD∗ = TCOA∗, and ZTHR∗ be
threshold values larger than the corresponding TCAS II RA threshold values. For all
relative states s, sz,v, vz, TCASII RA(s, sz,v, vz) =⇒ WCV∗(s, sz,v, vz).
Despite Theorem 3.1, it has been observed in flight tests that it is still possible for
TCAS II to issue an RA before a violation of an extended well-clear volume. The reason
for this apparent inconsistency is that Theorem 3.1 assumes that the same state infor-
mation, in vector form, is available to both systems, yet this is not the case. In the case
of the well-clear concept, state information in vector form is readily available through
modern global positioning systems. On the other hand, TCAS II assumes that aircraft
are equipped with active transponders, and the lack of reliable vector information is
compensated for by a sophisticated tracking system. This tracking system is a key
component of the TCAS II RA system, and depending on the quality of the range rate
estimate computed by the tracker and other conditions, the TCAS II RA system may
disable the use of the horizontal miss distance filter in Formula (2), i.e., HMDF(s,v)
is considered to be true, leading to the case of TCAS II RAs preceding violation of the
extended well-clear volume.
4. DAIDALUS
The RTCA SC-228 Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Un-
manned Aircraft Systems includes a reference implementation of DAA algorithms that
assist remote pilots by providing situational awareness of proximity to other aircraft
in the airspace. This reference implementation, called DAIDALUS (Detect & Avoid
Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems [Mun˜oz et al. 2015], is being developed by the
LaRC Formal Methods group in support of NASA’s Safe Autonomous System Opera-
tions (SASO) project. The DAIDALUS source code is available in both C++ and Java
under NASA’s Open Source Agreement2.
The algorithms contained in DAIDALUS compute: (1) predictions of well-clear viola-
tions between the ownship and a given intruder aircraft, (2) maneuver guidance for the
ownship to maintain or regain well-clear status with respect to all traffic aircraft, and
(3) an alert level representing the severity of a potential well-clear violation between
the ownship and a given intruder aircraft.
A fundamental element of DAIDALUS is the algorithm that computes the time inter-
val of violation for a non-maneuvering encounter. This algorithm, called wc interval,
has as inputs a relative aircraft state and a non-empty lookahead time interval [B, T ],
with 0 ≤ B < T . It returns the time interval [tin, tout], which corresponding to the in-
terval of a predicted well-clear violation, assuming constant-velocity trajectories. The
returned interval is empty if no such violation is predicted. Theorem 4.1 states that
wc interval is correct and complete.
THEOREM 4.1 (CORRECT AND COMPLETE). For all relative states s, sz,v, vz and
times B, T , with 0 ≤ B < T , let [tin, tout] be the time interval returned by
wc interval(s, sz,v, vz, B, T ) and t be a time in [B, T ], then WCV(s + tv, sz + tvz,v, vz)
if and only if t ∈ [tin, tout].
The local convexity property given by Theorem 2.2 is a necessary condition for the
existence of an algorithm, such as wc interval, that satisfies Theorem 4.1. Without
local convexity, either one of the implications in the theorem must be removed.
The algorithms that comprise DAIDALUS are specified in PVS, and a large number
of their functional requirements, such as Theorem 4.1, are proven to hold in these for-
mal models of the algorithms. The DAIDALUS algorithms are implemented in Java
2http://github.com/nasa/wellclear.
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and C++, and the formal verification of these implementations, while possible in some
cases, is exceedingly difficult. The difficulty arises due to the use of floating point arith-
metic in the implementations, while the formal verification of these algorithms is done
over the real numbers. This difficulty is also partially due to the object-oriented na-
ture of these languages versus the functional PVS notation. The difficulty is further
compounded when, as in the case of DAIDALUS, the properties to be verified are them-
selves complex.
The validation of the DAIDALUS software implementation is performed using a
more pragmatic approach named model animation [Dutle et al. 2015]. While model
animation does not offer the same high level of safety assurance as a complete for-
mal verification, it addresses the numerical issues in practical way, while still offering
strong assurance that the implemented software performs to its specification. Three
elements are required in order to implement the technique: (1) there must be an ex-
ecutable formal model of the software, which has been verified to possess the desired
properties of the actual software, (2) the software to be assessed needs to be a close
translation from the formal specification into the desired language, and (3) a collection
of representative test cases must be selected in some manner decided by the user. Each
test case is then evaluated using the formal model and the software implementation,
and the results are compared. If the results are sufficiently close for an acceptable
number of the test cases, then the software is considered to faithfully implement the
formal model. However, there are details which present technical challenges in the
model animation process.
The algorithms in DAIDALUS use mathematical functions such as roots, trigono-
metric, and inverse trigonometric functions. Due to the presence of irrational and
transcendental numbers, the outputs computed by these algorithms are not exact.
Nonetheless, other than the presence some of these non-computable functions, the for-
mal specifications of the DAIDALUS algorithms are executable using the PVS ground
evaluator. In order to fully execute these algorithms, PVS includes an animation tool
called PVSio [Mun˜oz 2003], which extends the ground evaluator, notably by providing
support for semantic attachments; a semantic attachment is a way to replace a PVS
function call with a call to a trusted oracle. In its default mode, PVSio replaces non-
computable mathematical functions with internal LISP floating point functions. When
more precision is needed, or when floating point evaluation must be avoided, these
standard functions are replaced with a collection of attachments that are formally ver-
ified in PVS to be correct up to a given, but arbitrary, precision.
Other fundamental model animation design decisions relate to the selection of a
proper collection of test cases, how to determine when outputs are “sufficiently close,”
and how many disagreements between the software and the model are acceptable. The
selection of a set of test cases for this method can be done in any number of ways.
Test cases might be selected to ensure some code coverage criteria are met, or a large
number of random cases may be chosen to allow for a wide variety of inputs to be
generated, or other desired criteria may go into the selection process. In the case of as-
sessing the DAA functionality of DAIDALUS, the test set chosen began as a collection
of 95 aircraft encounter scenarios, which were developed jointly by the USAF, MIT Lin-
coln Laboratory, and NASA during the UAS SARP activity. These scenarios represent
a suite of stressing cases which were designed to be difficult cases for the well-clear
logic. Throughout the DAIDALUS development and assessment process, a number of
additional stressing scenarios have been provided by the FAA, and others, and added
to the test set.
For some of the functionality provided by DAIDALUS, testing whether the formal
models and their reference implementations agree or not is straightforward. For ex-
ample, the well-clear violation logic computes a boolean value indicating the well-clear
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status between the ownship and an intruder aircraft. Testing if this logic is correctly
implemented in software amounts to checking if the same boolean value is computed
in both the formal model and the software implementation. However, for algorithms
that compute a numerical value, the verification is less straightforward. In such cases,
even very close outputs might be different due to numerical approximations. For these
numerical differences, an allowable tolerance for each particular output is determined.
If the difference between the formal model and the implementation is within this tol-
erance, then the two are declared to be in agreement. These tolerances are determined
on a case-by-case basis, based on the needed accuracy of the output. For example, if
the output is a time value intended to be displayed to an operator in whole number
seconds then a tolerance for such a value might be set to 0.5 seconds. Furthermore, if
the output is a distance based on ADS-B, then a tolerance of one meter might be suf-
ficient, since the guaranteed accuracy of ADS-B is within approximately five meters.
The choices made for these tolerances also directly affect the number of cases in which
the software and formal model disagree, which is the final criterion for determining
whether or not they agree, overall.
In the case of DAIDALUS, this validation procedure is being performed in conjunc-
tion with the development of the software. As such, the procedure not only validates
that the software is in agreement with its formal model, but also reveals places where
the software must be modified to be in closer agreement with its formal model. At
each step in this iterative process, the DAIDALUS software implementation is brought
closer to matching its formal model in all of its functionality, thus providing a high level
of assurance that the implemented software retains the safety properties proven in the
formal model.
5. CONCLUSION
Motivated by the safety-critical nature of a detect and avoid concept and the corre-
sponding need for strong assurances and mathematical guarantees, Formal Methods
research has contributed to the formal development of a DAA concept for UAS. The use
of Formal Methods in the DAA problem includes a formal definition of the well-clear
violation volume, formal proofs of its key properties, formal specification and verifica-
tion of DAA algorithms, and the rigorous validation of the software implementation
of these algorithms against their formal specifications. All formal specifications and
proofs supporting this work are written and mechanically verified in the interactive
theorem prover, PVS.
The application of Formal Methods to the safety analysis of air traffic management
systems faces technical challenges common to complex cyber-physical systems (CPS).
Chief among these challenges is the interaction of these systems with the physical en-
vironment that yields mathematical models with both continuous and discrete behav-
iors. Formally proving properties involving continuous mathematics, such non-linear
arithmetic, in particular, is a well-known problem in automated deduction. As part
of this research effort, several automated decision and semi-decision procedures for
dealing with different kinds of non-linear real arithmetic problems have been devel-
oped [Narkawicz et al. 2015; Moscato et al. 2015; Denman and Mun˜oz 2014; Narkawicz
and Mun˜oz 2014; Mun˜oz and Narkawicz 2013]. Most of these procedures are formally
verified and are available as proof-producing automated strategies in the PVS theorem
prover.
The formal verification of software implementations of a CPS is a major endeavor,
even when the algorithms that are implemented have been formally verified. The main
difficulty arises from the fact that modern programming languages use floating point
arithmetic, while formal verification is usually performed over the real numbers. Fur-
thermore, there is a large semantic gap between modern programming languages and
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the functional notation used in formal tools such as PVS. In the research discussed in
this paper, model animation is used as a practical approach to the validation of nu-
merical software. Model animation compares computations performed in the software
implementations against those symbolically evaluated to an arbitrary precision on the
corresponding formal models. While this approach does not provide an absolute guar-
antee that the software is correct, it increases the confidence that the formal models
are faithfully implemented in code.
Finally, air traffic management systems are unique in many aspects. For instance,
these systems involve human and automated elements and these elements are often
subject to strict operational and legal requirements. These requirements restrict the
design space of operational concepts, such as DAA for UAS. More importantly, new con-
cepts and algorithms have to support an incremental evolution of the airspace system
on a global scale. Thus, solutions may result which are non-optimal from a theoreti-
cal point of view, or which may have complex verification issues due to legacy systems
such as TCAS. This article has presented a survey of Formal Methods research and
applications to the practical problem of safely integrating UAS into the NAS, a de-
sign space thus constrained by requirements for safety, interoperability with legacy
systems, regulatory compliance, and public trust.
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